No, the Honorable Allahabad Hight Court in the case of M/s. Yadav Steels v. Additional Commissioner and Anr. [Writ Tax No. 975 of 2023 dated 15.02.2024] dismissed the writ petition thereby holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be applicable for appeal filed under Section 107 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
The Honorable Allahabad High Court observed that Section 107(4) of the UPGST Act allows an extension for a period of one month. Also, Section 107 aims to prevent undue delay in the adjudication process and promote effective administration of the GST regime.
The Honorable Court relying upon the judgment of Honorable Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s. Abhishek Trading Corporation v. Commissioner (Appeals) and Anr. [Writ Tax No. 1394 of 2023 dated 19.01.2024] noted that the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is a special statute and a self-contained code in itself and Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable.
The Honorable Court opined that the judgment of the Honorable Calcutta High Court in the case of K. Chakra Borty and Sons. v. Union of India and Others. [MAT 81 of 2022 dated December 01, 2023, wherein it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable as Section 107 of the CGST Act does not expressly or impliedly exclude the attraction of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable in the present case.
Author’s Comments
If the appeal is filed after the period of condonation permitted in section 107(4) (3+1 months), the Appellate authority does not have statutory authority to condone the delay, not even if the reasons are ample and deserve to be entertained. The appeal must be dismissed for being fatally belated because the Legislature has allowed Appellate authority this much authority and not more.
The Honorable Supreme Court has declined in Singh Enterprises v. CCE 2008 (221) ELT 163 that where the period of limitation is specifically provided in the statute, admitting appeals albeit for ‘sufficient cause’ would render statutory provisions impossible. And Appellate Authority thus being the denuded of authority to condone (due to lapse of maximum time permitted) is barred from examining the cause and condone the delays even for a ‘good and sufficient’ reason.
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